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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This  study  is designed  to assess  the  likely effects of 
reducing  intra-Community  barriers  to  trade  on  innovation rates in 
European  industry.  It exploits  a  relatively unique  data base  on 
majnr  innovations  in  the  UK.  data which  is not,  unfortunately, 
available  for  the  other countries of  the  Community.  Although  this 
may  limit  the  generality of  the  results somewhat,  many  of  the most 
interesting properties of  this data have  also  been detected  in 
studies on  US  data.  It is not  unreasonable,  therefore,  to  treat  the 
results discussed  below as  creating a  presumption which is applicable 
throughout  the  Community  in  the  absence  of  explic1t  eviden~e to  thP. 
contrary. -5-
II.  THE  POLICY  ISSUES  AND  EXPERIMENTAL  DESIGN  OF  THE  STlDY 
The  evidence  suggests  that  there exist  a  number  of  obstacles 
which  inhibit  trade within  the  Community,  and  there are good  reasons 
to  think that  removing  them  <or.  at  least,  ameliorating  their 
effects)  may  bring substantial gains  to all member  states.  Several 
policy initiatives have  been  advanced  to  tackle these  problems  in 
various  ways,  and  there  is little doubt  that  they  are  likely  to 
improve  the  allocative efficiency of  the  internal  Community  market  to 
some  greater or lesser extent.  They  seem  likely to achieve  this 
effect in one  or both  of  two  interdependent  ways.  First.  many  of  the 
initiatives currently under  active discussion will  increase  the size 
of  the  market  that  firms  operate in.  For  example,  both  reductions in 
tariffs andior non-tariff barriers to  trade  and  new  inltiatives 
designed  to  open  transportation services up  to more  competition will 
have  the effect of  reducing  transportation costs  (considered 
broadly),  and  so increase  the market  area open  to  a  firm producing  in 
any  given  location.  Second,  many  of  the  proposed  policy initiatives 
will  have  an  effect on  the  degree  of  competition  in markets.  Thus. 
moves  to strengthen competition policy  and  to  open  up  public 
procurement  practices are  likely to  increase  the  competitiveness of 
markets,  particularly those  inhabited  by  large  dominant  firms  and/or 
protected "national  champions". 
Not  only is efficiency likely to  increase if either type  of 
policy  takes effect,  but,  more  importantly,  the  two  types of policy 
are  likely to be  mutually  reinforcing.  Reductions  in tariffs and/or 
transport costs not only  increase  the effective market  area of  any 
particular firm but,  by  doing so  for all  firms,  they  increase the 
number  of effective competitors that  any  particular firm is likely to -6-
face  both  in  newly  opened  market  areas  as  well  as  1n  fo~erlv closed 
home  bases.  Similarly.  increases  in  competition which  lower  prices 
and  stimulate cost  reducing or  new  product  innovations  are  likely  to 
widen  existing markets.  Such  an  effect rnight9  perhaps9 be  expected 
from  a  loosening  of  constraints on  defense  related  public  procurement 
if it leads  to  a  much  higher  level  of  technological  spillages into 
the  civilian sector,  and  so  to  a  higher  level  of  new  product 
generation  in  consumer  goods.  More  prosaically.  airline deregulation 
in the  US  has  made  clear  the  tremendous  widening  of  rr.arkets  that  can 
be  induced  by  eliminating restrictions on  competition. 
Thus.  the  primary  effects of  reducing  intra-community  trade 
barriers will  be  an  increase  in market  size  and  in  the  degree  of 
competition  in  the  newly  enlarged market.  These  changes,  in turn, 
are  likely to affect  the  efficiency of  firms  and  the  performance of 
markets  in several  important ways.  In tracing  these effects, it is 
necessary  to distinguish static efficiency,  the  effectiveness of 
exploiting given  levels  of  technology,  from  dynamic  efficiency,  the 
effectiveness of efforts  to  push  back  technological  constraints. 
The  likely effect of  increasing market  size  and  the  degree  of 
competition on static efficiency is straightforward,  and  the  only 
controversy  that exists concerns its order of magnitude.  As  market 
size increases,  whatever  limitations that  demand  may  have  formerly 
put  upon  the  realization of  scale economies  are  removed,  and  firms 
will  be  able  to move  further down  their average cost curves.  Perhaps 
somewhat  more  substantively,  increases in the degree  of  competiton in 
markets  are  likely to encourage  firms  to  reduce  levels of 
X-inefficiency,  a  movement  from  current  cost curves  towards  the  true 
long  run average cost  curve.  These  two  effects - movements  along  a -7-
declining  cost  curve  and  movements  between  cost  curves  - clearly 
reinforce  each  other.  and  lead  to  an  unambigious  predict1on  that 
costs are  likely  to  fall  as market  size  and  the  degree  of  competition 
increase. 
The  effects of  market  size  and  competition  on  dynamic 
efficiency,  however,  are much  less clear.  Certainly it seems 
plausible  to  believe  that  increases  in  market  size will  increase 
innovativeness,  particularly if there  are  any  economies  of  scale or 
fixed costs in the  research and  development  process.  However,  the 
effect  of  competition on  innovativeness  is rather controversial.  In 
particular.  Schumpeterian  arguments  suggest  that  at  least  some  degree 
of  monopoly  power  is conducive  to  innovativeness,  and  that  large 
firms  are  likely  to  be  the  most  fecund  in this  respect.  If these 
Schumpeterian assertions are correct,  then it is no  longer clear that 
removing obstacles to  intra-Community  trade will  improve  dynamic 
efficiency.  Indeed·,  it is possible  that  the static efficiency gains 
arising from  such a  policy will  be  more  than outweighted  by  losses 
arising  from  a  reduction in dynamic  efficiency.  In short.  it appears 
that  a  rather crucial  step in  the  argument  for opening  up  internal 
Community  markets is the  link between  the  degree  of  competition and 
innovation. 
The  crux of  the matter is clearly Schurnpeterian assertions 
about  firm size,  monopoly,  and  the  innovativeness of  firms.  There 
are,  in principle,  two  types of effect  that monopoly  power  can  have 
on  innovative activity:  a  direct effect,  or,  the  effect  that  monopoly 
power  has  on  the  response  to  any given  level  of  expected 
post-innovation returns;  and  an  indirect effect,  or,  the effect  that 
monopoly  power has on expected  post-innovation returns  and  thence  on (2) 
-8-
innovative  activ1ty.  It  1s  widely  believed  that  the  1ndirect  efect 
of  monopoly  power  on  innovation  is positive  (i.e.  that  monopoly 
boosts  expected post-innovation  returns  and  so  increases 
innovativeness).  but  that  the  direct effect may  be  negative  (i.e. 
that  monopolists  respond  more  slowly than competitive  firms  to  a 
given  level  of  expected  post-innovation  returns).  If  the  direct 
effect is relatively small  or if it is positive.  then it is hard  to 
dispute  Schumpeterian assertions  that  monopoly  power  is conducive  to 
innovation.  If,  on  the  other hand,  the  indirect effect is relatively 
small  and  the direct effect is negative.  then it follows  that 
monopoly  inhibits innovativesness  and  that  competition stimulates it. 
This,  of course,  would  imply  that  the  dynamic  efficiency consequences 
of  removing  intra-Community  barriers to trade will  aug~ent and  not 
offset  the static efficiency gains  that  may  emerge  fro~ such  a 
policy. 
Although it seems  to  be  impossible  to determine  the size 
much  less  the  sign of  the  total  (direct  plus  indirect)  effect of 
competition  on  innovation  a  priori,  it is nevertheless worth 
exploring  the  a  priori arguments  in more  depth.  Given  that  indirect 
effects are  likely to  be  positive (i.e.  increasing monopoly  or 
reducing  competition  increases  innovativeness).  it turns out  to  be 
the  case  that  whether  the  total effect is positive or negative 
depends  on  whether  an undoubtedly superior ability enjoyed  by  large 
firms  with market  power  is more  than offset  by  the weakening  of 
incentives that market  power  gives  rise to.  Appreciating  the  force 
of  the  argument  requires an understanding of  the several  factors 
which give  rise  to direct  and  indirect effects,  and  we  shall consider 
them  in  reverse order. -9-
The  indirect effect  of  monopoly  on  Innovation  hinges  on  the 
effect  that  current  monopoly  has  on  expected  post-innovation  returns 
(and.  of  course,  the  effect  that  the  latter has  on  innovative 
activity).  The  most  straightforward  and  plausible  argument  in 
support  of  the  propositiion that  the  indirect effect  is positive is that 
firms  which  currently enjoy  a  substantial  degree  of  market  power  will 
be  well  placed  to  erect  barriers  to  future  entry.  This,  of course, 
limits  the  degree  to  which  rivals  can  imitate  an  innovation when  it 
is first  introduced,  and  thus  raises  the  percentage  of  the  total 
gains  to  innovating which  the initial innovator can appropriate  for 
Itself.  Hence,  because  a  monopolist  is likely to  be  in a  position to 
appropriate  more  of  the  expected gains arising  from  any  given 
innovation  than  a  more  competitive  firm  can,  the  monopolist  is more 
likely  to  Innovate. 
The  second  reason  to  expect  a  positive indirect effect is 
much  more  subtle.  Positions of  monopoly  are,  at  base,  founded  on 
innovations  of  some  sort.  and  thus  the activity of  those  firms  which 
currently enjoy  market  power  depends  upon  exploiting  their own 
previous  innovations.  More  competitive  rivals and  new  entrants are 
likely  to  be,  at best,  imitators,  and  to  enjoy  only  restricted access 
to  the original  innovation.  Thus,  if the  results of current 
innovative activity complement  those  innovations which  have  already 
been  made  by  a  firm with market  power,  then it will  gain more  from 
introducing  the  new  innovation  than will  competitive  rivals or new 
entrants.<I)  It follows  that if one  observes  a  sequence  of 
complementary  innovations,  then  the  whole  sequence  is likely  to  have 
been  introduced  by  only  one  firm,  and,  in particular,  by  the  firm 
which  introduced  the first  inno"~:?.~ion in the  sequence.  Since  that -10-
act  is  likely  to  give  r1se  to  at  least  some  monopoly  power.  then,  as 
a  practical  matter.  one  is  likely to observe  more  innovations  bv 
monopolists  than  by  competitive  firms  (ceteris paribus). 
The  direct effect  of  monopoly  on  innovation  (that  is.  the 
effect of  market  power  on  the  response  to  a  given  level  of 
post-innovation  returns)  depends  upon  several  offsetting factors.  The 
most  controversial  element  of  the  argument  pits  the  positivP  direct 
effects of  various  "material  advantages"  that  monopolists  may  enjoy 
against  several  "behavioural  disadvantages"  that may  weaken  their 
performance.(2)  Numerous  types  of material  advantage  have  been 
suggested  in  the  literature.  Economies  of  scale in research or 
economies  of  scope  within  a  portfolio of  related  research  programmes 
may  exist,  complementari~ies between  research  and  marketing  may  yield 
important  comparative  advantages  to  large  firms  with well  established 
distribution networks  or with advertising skills,  and  so  on.  Indeed, 
many  of  these  advantages  spring  from  the  high profits that market 
power  is  likely  to  yield.  Access  to  internal  funds  weakens  a  firm's 
reliance  on  external  credit markets,  and  this  may  enable it to 
operate  more  flexibly,  to  take  a  longer  term  view,  and,  perhaps,  to 
act  less cautiously  than  relatively poorly  informed  financiers  may 
deem  prudent. 
If  they exist.  all  such material  advantages undoubtedly  give 
monopolists  the ability to act more  innovatively  than more 
competitive  firms.  Whether monopolists  exploit  this potential  and 
actual  innovate more  is another question altogether.  The  absence  of 
competitive  forces  may  enable managers  to  indulge in a  preference for 
leisure or  ~!:3w them  to  become  sleepy.  Levels of X-inefficiency may 
climb,  and  bureauocratic caution and  inertia may  come  to dominate  a -11-
firm's  act1vities.  paralyzing 1ts creativity and  1n1t1ative.  and 
atrophing its ability  to  respond  flexibly  to  events.  Thus,  market 
power  protects  that  possess it protects against  competitive  forces, 
but,  if it is mainly  the  threat  of  competition which  encourages  firms 
to  be  innovative  and  efficient.  then market  power  is  likely  to  give 
rise  to  relativley 
rates. 
slack  behaviour,  and  so  retard  innovation 
Whether  the  material  advantages  of  monopoly  overcome  the 
possible behavioural  shortcomings  of  monopolists is an  open question 
a  priori.  There  are,  however,  at  least  two  good  reasons  to  suppose 
that  the direct  effect  of  monopoly  on  innovative activity will  be 
negative unless  the  possibly superior ability of monopolists  to 
1nnovate  more  than offsets  any  ~eaker incentives  they  may  experience. 
First,  a  more  competitive  environment  means,  inter alia,  that more 
firms  are  likely to  be  searching  for possible  innovations,  and  this 
clearly raises the probability of  observing  an  innovation  by  some 
time  t  either because  the  more  firms  there  are  searching,  the  more 
likely it is that  one  of  them will  find  something worthwhile.  or 
because  the  more  there  are searching,  the  harder each will search.()) 
Thus,  the  more  competitive  a  market.  the  more  likely it is that  an 
innovation will  be  generated. 
The  second  reason  for suspecting that direct effects,  on 
balance,  may  be  negative is that monopolists  may  not  only generate 
less  innovations  than firms  in a  competitive market,  they  may  also  be 
less quick in adopting  innovations which  are  produced  elsewhere.  This 
possibility arises whenever  introducing  a  new  innovation displaces 
part of  the activities of  the old  one  upon  which  the current 
monopoly  position is based  (roughly whenever successive  innovations -12-
are substitutes).  The  ga1n  to  innovation  in  these  circumstances  is 
the  level  of  expected  post-innovation prof]ts net  of  the  profits  on 
current activities which will  be  displaced  by  the  innovation.  Since 
these  latter are  likely to  be  enhanced  by  monopoly  power.  it follows 
that  the  incentive  for  a  monopolist  to  adopt  new  technologies  is 
lower  than  for  a  competitive  firm  not  earning  excess  profits on 
current activities  (ceteris paribus).(4) 
Since  the  indirect  effect of  monopoly  on  innovation  is  likely 
to  be  positive, it follows  that  the  persuasiveness  Schumpeterian 
assertions ultimately hinges  on  the  notion  that  the material 
advantages  of monopolists  at  least  roughly  compensate  for  any 
behavioural  disadvantages  or other factors  which  might  weaken  the 
response  of  a  monopolist  to  profitable  innovative actl\"ities.  By 
contrast~  the anti-Schumpeterian position asserts that  the 
behavioural  disadvantages  created  by  monopoly  not  only  overwhelm 
other positive direct effects of market  power  on  innovation.  but  also 
more  than compensate  for  positive indirect effects.  In  this case 
monopolists  are  less  likely to  innovate  than  firms  in more 
competitive markets  (ceteris paribus),  and  Schumpeterian assertions 
must  be  resisted. 
The  policy implications of  the  relationship  between 
competition and  innovation are  profound,  and  three  are  particularly 
relevant  in the current context.  First,  many  of  the  arguments  which 
have  led national  governments  to centre  their public  procurement  and 
research activity in the  hands  of  a  small  number  of  "national 
champions"  are Schumpeterian in origin.  The  proponents  of  these 
arguments  have  stressed material  advantages which,  they  have 
asserted,  more  than compensate  for  behavioural disadvantages  and -13-
other negative  factors.  If.  however.  the  Schumpeterldn  argument  is 
invalid  then  the  attractiveness of  th1s  type  of  policv is much 
attenuated,  and  more _competitive  alternatives become  important  policy 
options.  Second,  Schumpeterian assertions have  often been  used  as  a 
caveat  to  proposals  1n  favour  of  more  vigorous  anti-trust activity. 
What  is asserted  in such  objections  is a  kind  of  dynamic  economies  vs 
( - ) 
.monopoly  power  trade-off,  ~.  one  that is non-existent  if the 
Schumpeterian  hypothesis  is invalid.  Both  a  loosening  of  procurement 
policies  and  a  strengthening ·of  compeition  policy are.  of  course, 
part  of  the  broader  range  of  policies discussed in the context  of 
opening  up  internal  Community  markets.  These  are  likely to affect 
both market  size  and  the  degree  of  competition.  and  the  third  policy 
implication of  the  relationship  between  competition and  innovation is 
that,  if  the  Schumpeterian  hypothesis  is correct,  then  these policies 
are  liable to realize static efficiency gains only at  the cost of at 
least  some  worsening of  dynamic  efficiency.  If, however,  the 
Schumpeterian hypothesis  is invalid,  then  the static gains  to opening 
up  intra-Community markets  will  understate  the  total  gains  to such 
policies.  The  attraction of  such  policies  then  becomes  difficult  to 
resist. 
Thus,  an  examination  of  the  Schumpeterian hypothesis is a 
major step in  the  argument  in favour  of  policy initiatives to break 
down  barriers  to  trade within  the  Community.  In fact,  the data 
provide  almost  no  support  for  the  Schumpeterian position,  and  thus 
suggest  that  there is little reason  to believe that  a  trade-off 
exists between monopoly  power  and  dynamic  efficiency.  We  shall 
examine  this evidence in two  stages.  First,  in Section III,  we 
explore  the  relationship  between  firm size and  innovation,  and, 
second,  in Section  IV,  chat  between  the  degree  of  competition and -14-
Innovation.  Section  IV  also  puts  the  results  in  a  somewhat  wider 
perspective  by  exploring  the  interactions  between  market  size.  the 
degree  of  competition.  and  innovativeness.  Section  V summarizes  the 
report. -15-
III.  FIR."'t  SIZE  AND  INNOVATION 
Although  the  Schumpeterian hypothesis  is generally considered 
to  be  one  which  relates  innovativeness  to  the  degree  of  competition. 
it often also  appears  as  a  relationship  between  large  firm  size  and 
innovation.  The  two  types  of  arguments  are  by  no  means  identical~ 
but  they  are fairly similar at  a  broad  level.  The  main  case  made  for 
and  against  the  hvpothesized  firm  size  - innovation  relationship  is 
generally  a  variant  of  the  "material  advantages"  versus  "behavioural 
disadvantages"  argument  discussed  above  in connection with direct 
effects.  However.  it is also  possible  to  detect at  least  one 
indirect  effect  of  firm  size on  innovation which  may  be  important. 
Let  us  briefly consider each  type  of  argument  in  turn  before 
examining  the  evidence. 
In the first place.  size may  have  an effect on  the  efficiency 
with which  research inputs  process  are  transformed  into  the  output  of 
innovations.  A possible  advantage  accruing  from  size is the ability 
to  employ  specialised equipment  and  personnel.  and  so  extend  the 
division of  labour  in  research.  In addition,  researchers  may  be  more 
productive  when  they  have  more  colleagues  to  interact with,  leading 
to  an  increased probability that unforeseen  results will  be 
recognised as  impottant.  Much  the  same  effect may  arise when 
several  related  research projects are  run  in  tandem.  On  the  other 
hand,  large  firms  may  experience  problems  in initiating or 
maintaining their research programme  because of internal difficulties 
in coordinating their activities.  This  may  arise  because  of  the 
sheer number  of  successive  layers of hierarchy in  the  firm  through 
which  ideas are  required  to pass.  Further.  to  the  extent  that  it is 
administration  rather  than  researr~ which  tends  to offer the most 
attractive prospects in terms  of  pay  and  status in  large firms,  then (3) 
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the  incentives  facing  talented  employees  may  drive  them  away  from 
research based  activities.  Thus.  like monopolists,  large  firms 
potentially suffer  from  behavioural  shortcomings  which  must  be  set 
against whatever material  advantages  they  can  command.  The  direct 
effect of  firm size on  innovation is,  therefore,  ambiguous. 
There  is,  however,  at  least  one  indirect effect which  may  be 
positive,  since  fi~ size may  have  an  effect  on  the magnitude  of 
post-innovation  returns.  The  point is simply  that  the  total 
potential  returns  to  an  innovation may  be  higher  the  larger is the 
market  to which it is applied,  and  the  returns  net  of  costs  can  be 
larger for  large  firms  able  to  pre-empt  most  of  the  total  market  and 
spread  their fixed  costs over  a  greater sales volume.  For  example. 
the  potential  returns  to  a  process  innovation  ~ill vary directly with 
the  level  of output  produced using  the process.  In perfectly 
functioning  markets,  this is not  an  important  issue since  innovations 
can  be  sold  to other firms  in the market,  thus  enabling  the  innovator 
to  maximize  the  net  gains  from  research  and  innovative act1vity. 
However,  the  market  in  innovations  is liable  to  be  an  imperfect  one, 
if only  because  it is frequently difficult  for  a  seller to  inform a 
potential  buyer  about  the  nature  of  the  innovation without.  at  the 
same  time,  forfeiting his/her monopoly  over  the  innovation  (once  a 
potential  buyer knows  what  it is,  there is no  need  to  buy  it). Hence, 
the major gains  are  likely to come  from  own  use  and,  in this 
situation,  a  large  firm may  have  more  incentive  to  innovate  than  a 
small  firm. 
Most  empirical  work  on  this issue  has  tended  to  focus  on 
relating  th~  ~ntensity of  R & D input,  measured either by  expenditure 
or by  the  employment  of  research personnel,  to  firm size measured  in -17-
various  ways.  The  evidence  suggests  that  R~D  1ntens1t~ tends  to  rise 
more  than  proportionately with  firm size initially,  but,  after some 
threshold of  R&D  intensity is reached,  it  remains  constant  or even 
declines.  This  threshold is likely  to  vary  across  industries,  but 
there are  indications  that it may  lie somewhere  near  the  bottom 
range  of  Fortune's  500  industrials  listing.(6)  Although  this would 
seem  to  suggest  that  large  firms  are  more  innovative.  there  are, 
however.  at  least  two  reasons  for  expressing  doubt.  First,  smaller 
firms  generally  do  not  have  formal  R&D  programs  and  thus  their 
research inputs  are not  picked  up  in official  R&D  statistics.  This 
does  not  imply  that  such  firms  do  no  research,  but  rather that 
official  R&D  statistics are  biased  towards  measuring  the  research 
activities of  very  large  firms.  Secondly,  there may  be  systematic 
differences  in  the  efficiency with  which  firms  undertake  a  given 
amount  of  research,  leading  to different  innovative output  rat~s from 
a  given set of  inputs. 
Doubts  about  the  relative efficiency with which  large  firms 
do  research strike at  the  heart  of  Schumpeterian assertions  about  the 
benefits of  large  firm  size.  Direct  evidence  on  this issue  not  only 
makes  plain some  of  the hazards  of using  input data on  R&D  to measure 
innovative output  rates,  but  also  seems  directly germane  to  the 
question of whether  the direct effects of size are positive  (large 
firm size increases innovativeness)  or negative.  Certainly the 
available evidence suggests that,  in fact,  smaller firms  appear to  be 
far  more. efficient than their larger rivals.  For  example, 
investigations of  expenditure  per patent  and  of  comparable  parallel 
product  development  efforts undertaken by  firms  of different sizes 
reveal  that smaller firms  incur  lower costs,  and  produce far more 
output per unit of expenditure.  Further,  it is often observed  that -18-
small  firms  are  qu1cker  in  br1ng1ng  new  products  to  the  market.  They 
often seem  to  engineer  new  products  in  up  to  70  per cent  of  the  time 
taken  by  large  firms.  develop  prototypes  twice  as  fast.  establish 
production marginally faster.  and start up  sales in up  to  two  thirds 
of  the  time  taken  by  large  firms.  Finally,  numerous  studies suggest 
that  large  firms  frequently  produce  rather minor  innovations,  relying 
heavily  on  small  firms  for  ideas  which  they  may  improve  and  develop 
for  co~~ercial applications.(/) 
If,  as  seems  to  be  the  case,  there is a  real  danger in using 
information  on  R & D inputs  to  make  inferences about  the  relationship 
between  firm  size  (or.  for  that  matter.  market  power)  and 
innovativeness,  then it is  important  to concentrate on  work  which 
uses  direct  measures  of  innovative  output.  Our  major  source  of 
information derives  from  work  done  by  researchers  in  S.P.R.U.  at  the 
University of  Sussex,  identifying 4378  major  innovations  introduced 
in the  U.K.  over the period  1945-83.  By  "major",  one  means  that 
innovations  in this data set have,  in general,  been  deemed  to  be 
technically  important  and  commercially  successful.  Although clearly 
but  a  sub-set of  the  total innovative activity in an  economy,  major 
innovations are at  least  the most  important  and,  in our case,  the 
most  visible tip of  the  iceberg. 
Table  I  shows  the  proportion of  total  innovations originating 
from different sized innovating and  ownership units.  Column  (1) 
reveals  that small  and  medium  sized  innovating units make  a  major 
contribution to  total  innovations.  For  example,  85.3%  of all 
innovations  emerged  from  units of  less  than  10,000  employees  (that 
is,  from  firms  well  below  the size of  those  in Fortune's  top  500 
list),  48.2%  from  those with  less than  1000  employees  and  23.4%  from -19-
units with  under  200  employees.  At  best.  one  can  observe  a  verv  weak 
v-shaped  relationship  between  size  and  innovation.  but  even  this  does 
not  hide  the  basic  point  that  smaller  firms  are  responsible  for  a 
share of  total  innovations  which  far  exceeds  their share  of  economic 
activity measured  in  terms  of  sales,  employment  or value  added.  In 
fact~  Table  I  partially conceals  a  significant  rise  over  time  in 
the  share of  innovations  introduced  by  units sized  less  than  1000 
employees.  Th1s  share  has  more  or  less steadily  risen  from  36.7%  in 
1945-49  to  39.9%  (1950-54},  43.4%  (1955-59).  40.4%  (1960-64).  47% 
(1965-69),  50.7%  (1970-74),  58%  (1975-79),  and  to  59.9%  in  1980-83, 
and  has  come  largely at  the  expense  of  the  share  of  firms  in  the 
1000-9999  employees  size  range. 
Although  some  of  the  theoretical  arguments  listed  above  are 
more  applicable to the size of  the  innovating unit  rather than  the 
whole  firm,  it is the  latter which is the  main  focus  of  our interest. 
Column  (2)  expresses  the  size of  firms  in terms  of  UK  employment,  and 
reveals  that  firms  with  less  than  10,000  employees  accounted  for 
56.1~ of all innovations.  firms  with  less  than  1,000  employees  for 
33.2%,  and  firms  with  less  than  200  employees  for  li%.  No  matter  how 
one  looks  at it, small  and  medium  sized  firms  are clearly  responsible 
for  a  significant proportion of  innovations.  What  is not  apparent 
from  the  table is that  important  changes  appear  to have  taken place 
over  time  in the  role  played  by  both small  and  very  large firms.  In 
the  last three  years of  the  period,  43.2%  of  innovations  emanated 
from  firms  with  less  than  1,000  employees,  and  20.7%  were  accounted 
for  by  firms  who  employ  over  50,000  workers.  The  share of  firms  less 
than  ?.00  employees  rose  from  29.6%  in  1945  to  43.2%  in 1983,  while 
firms  of  size  50,000  employees  or more  accounted  for  17.7%  in  1945 
and  20.7%  in  1983. -20-
Table  I: 
Percent  of  Total  UK  Innovations  by  Size of  Unit,  1945-83 
1-199  Employees 
200-999  Employees 
1,000-9.999  Employees 
10.000-49,999  Employees 
50,000+  Employees 
Source:  adapted  from  Pavitt et al,  1987. 
( 1) 
Innovating 
Unit 
23.4% 
24.8% 
3 7 .1% 
11.0% 
3.7% 
( 2) 
UK  Ownership 
Unit 
17.0% 
16.2% 
22.9% 
23.0% 
20.9% 
Similar results have  also  emerged  from  two  large scale U.S. 
studies.  Feinman  and  Fuentevilla  (1976)  examined  500  important 
innovations which  were  first  introduced  in the u.s.  during  the  period 
1953-73.  Of  the  319  which  originated  from  U.S.  firms.  23.5%  came 
from  firms  with  less  than  100  employees,23.8%  from  firms  employing 
between  100  and  1,000,  13.2%  from  firms  with  1,001  - 5000  employees, 
5%  from  firms  employing  5001  - 10,000  and  the  remaining  34.5%  from 
firms  with  more  than  10,000  employees.  Edwards  and  Gordon  (1984) 
studied  8074  innovations  introduced  into  the  U.S.  in  1982,  and 
found  that  small  firms  (less  than  500  employees)  innovated at  about 
2.4  times  the  rate of  large  firms. 
The  only  conclusion  that  one  can  draw  from  Table  I  is that if 
there are any  important material  advantages  to doing  research and 
development,  they fail  to make  themselves  plain in the  :~~put of  the 
research  and  development  process.  Small  firms  are far more -21-
1nnovative  than  the1r  relative s1ze  would.  at first sight.  1nd1cate. 
Of  course,  this apparently major  role  played  by  mediu~ and  small 
sized firms  clearly varies  by  industry.  and  Table  II  shows  this 
inter-industry variation for  the data on  UK  innovations.  Firms  of 
size  less  than  1000  employees  are  important  in  the  Machinery  and 
Instruments  industries where  they  account  for  more  than  45%  of  all 
innovations.  Firms  of  more  than  10,000  employees,  on  the  other  hand, 
acco.unt  for  more  than  75i:.  of  all  innovations  in Mining.  Food. 
Chemicals  and  Electric  Products.  In  fact.  64%  of  all  small  firm 
innovations are concentrated in Machines,  Mechanic  Engineering,  and 
Instruments,  while  45%  of  large  firm  innovations  are  in  Chemicals~ 
Electrical  Engineering  and  Electronics  (compared  to  27%  of all 
innovations).  Thus.  small  firms  not  only  made  an  important 
contr1bution to overall  innovation  rates,  but  often  do  so  in  the 
most  innovative sectors. 
In short,  when  one  examines  the  relationship  between 
innovativeness  and  firm size  one  finds  no  substantive  reason  to  think 
that  large  firms  are.  in general.  relatively  innovative.  While 
looking at  crude  counts  of  innovations is not  a  particularly 
compelling way  to measure  material  advantages  and  behavioral 
disadvantages,  they  do  at  least give  some  useful  insight  into the 
net  advantages  of  firm size.  Perhaps  the  most  important  point  to 
grasp  from  the  evidence  is that  there  apparently exist  enormous 
differences in research efficiency between  large and  small  firms. 
Because it is more  than  likely that official  R&D  statistics 
drastically understate  the critical research inputs typically 
supplied by  smaller firms,  these differences  in relative efficiency 
may  be  somewhat  more  apparent  thar- ~~al.  Nonetheless,  the fact  of -22-
Table  11: 
% of  TOTAL  INNOVATION  PRODUCED  BY  FIRMS  OF  DIFFERENT  SIZE 
No.  Innovations 
PRODUCING  SECTOR  Produced  1-99  200-999  1 .ooo- 10.000- 50.000+ 
9.999  49.999 
Agriculture  12  8.3  0  66.7  25.0  0 
Mining  126  0  2.4  0.8  12.7  84.1 
Food  112  3.6  _5.4  9.8  5i.l  2.:..1 
Chemicals  421  4.8  7.4  9.7  31.4  46.8 
Metals  186  0.5  3.8  25.8  15. 1  54.8 
Machinery  573  26.2  27.1  33.7  12.4  0.7 
Mechanical 
Engineering  558  14.0  12.0  18.5  38.4  17.2 
Instruments  332  31.6  18. 1.  15.4  16.6  18.4 
Electrical 
Engineering  346  3.2  2.3  4.0  15.3  75.1 
Electronics  428  17.5  8.9  12.4  27.3  33.9 
Shipbuilding & 
Offshore 
Engineering  67  13.4  14.~  46.3  23.9  1.  5 
Vehicles  212  9.4  8.5  28.8  27.4  25.9 
Aerospace  85  2.4  7. 1  17.6  29.4  43.5 
Textiles.  Leather 
& Clothing  144  20.1  11.8  32.6  6.9  28.5 
Bricks,  Pottery. 
Glass,  Cement  157  14.0  7.6  18.5  48.4  11.5 
Paper  54  16.7  20.4  13.0  38.9  11.1 
Printing  29  6.9  34.5  55.2  3.4  0 
Rubber & Plastics  91  15.4  27.5  1. 1  15.4  40.7 
Source:  Adapted  from  Pavitt et al  1987. -23-
matter  is that  there  exists  no  real  presumption  that  size  1s  a  reajor 
advantage.  except  possibly  in  a  few  sectors which  are  probably  more  the 
exception  than  the  rule.  Size  may  matter,  but  it is  by  no  means  the 
case  that  "big is beautiful". ~) 
-M-
IV.  THE  DEGREE  OF  COMPETITIO~ A~D  !~NOVATION  IN  MARKETS 
The  Schumpeterian hypotheses  about  the  determinants  of 
innovation go  well  beyond  propositions  about  firm  size~  and  assert that 
an  absence  of  rivalry  in markets  1s  also  conducive  to  innovativeness. 
The  argument  is controversial  because  there  are~  in principle,  two 
channels  by  which  market  structure affects  the  incentives  to  innovate. 
and  the  two  can  offset  each  other.  Thus  to  examine  the  Schumpeterian 
hypothesis  about  the  role  of  market  power.  one  would  like  to  try  to 
separately measure  both  the direct  and  the  indirect effects of  monopoly 
on  innovativeness.  The  former  can  be  detected  in experiments  which  let 
industry market  structure vary.  holding  the·  level  of  post-innovation 
returns constant.  Indirect  effects are  rather more  complex.  since  they 
trace  a  causal  channel  from  market  structure  to  post-innovation 
returns,  and  thence  to  innovation.  Measuring  the size of  indirect 
effects,  then,  requires  examining  the  two  partial correlations,  and 
multiplying  their effects  together.  The  total,  overall  effect of 
monopoly  on  innovation is simply  the  sum  of  the direct  and  indirect 
effects.(8) 
Thus,  we  are  interested in exploring  two  particular partial 
correlations  between market  structure and  innovation.  However,  such 
work  must  be  embedded  in a  full  model;  to  measure  these various partial 
correlations accurately,  one  must  take  care  to  "hold all  relevant 
things"  constant.  In  the context of multiple  regression,  this means 
that  one  must  hold  constant  those  factors  correlated with  the 
independent  variable of  interest  lest their effects on  the  dependent 
variable be  confused with  those  of  the  independent  variable.  Practially 
speaking,  this creates a  trade-off  between  the  inclusion of  irrelevant 
variables  (which  can  lower efficiency in estimation)  and  the  omission -25-
of  relevant  variables  twhich  can create  b1as>.  In  the  current  context. 
probably  the  most  important  factor  that  one  must  take  account  of  is 
variations in "technological  opportunity"  across  industries. 
"Technological  opportunity"  refers  to  the  fecundity  of  an  industry's 
scientific and  technological  base~  to  those  underly1ng~ dynamic 
conditions of  supply which  affect  the  average  productivity of  research 
inputs in producing  research output.  In  the  literature, it has  been 
measured  in  numerous  ways.  Scherer  (1967).  Lunn  and  ~artin  <1983)  and 
Shrieves  t1978)  used  subjectively chosen  dummy  variables  for certain 
high  technology  industries  (e.g.  life sciences,  electronics,  aerospace, 
mechanical  and  electromechanical  engineering~  chemicals  and  so  on); 
Waterson  and  Lopez  (1983)  used  capital  intensity and  the  rate  of  growth 
of  net  output  per head  as  proxies;  Hughes  (1984)  used  data  on  R&D 
intensity :in  the  U.S.,  France,  Germany  and  Japan  to  ind1cating 
technological  opportunity in the  UK  and,  finally and  perhaps most 
comprehensively,  Levin et al  (1985)  used  six proxies  reflecting the 
sources of  technical  knowledge,  industry maturity,  and  "closeness" to 
basic  and  applied science. 
The  importance  of  correcting for variations in technological 
opportunity across  industries arises  from  the  oft made  conjecture  that 
industries  in which  technological  opportunity is rich and  promising  are 
also  industries which  are highly concentrated.  There are several 
variants  to  this argument.  not all of which  are equally persuasive.  One 
might,  for example,  think that technological  opportunity is enriched  by 
Government  defense  related  rese~rch support.  Since  this is generally 
channelled to a  small  number  of  large  firms  in highly concentrated 
industries, it follows  that high concentration and  technological 
opportunity will  go  hand  in hand.  Alternately,  technological 
opportunity might  merely  reflect  the  ease of appropriability,  a  factor -M-
augmented  (or.  indeed.  perhaps  created)  by  strategic  investments  in 
barriers  to  entry made  by  leading  firms  in highly  concentrated 
industries.  Clearly,  for  these  and  other reasons.  it seems  likely  to 
be  the  case  that  failing  to correct for technological  opportunity may 
bias  the  measured  effect at  least  of  industry concentration on 
innovation.  The  interesting consequence  of  introducing  these various 
proxies  for  technological  opportunity into  regressions of  market 
concentration  on  research  input  or  output  is  that  they  generally  cause 
the  effect of  industry concentration  on  innovativeness  to  diminish 
considerably,  and  estimates of  this effect  tend  to  become 
insignificantly different  from  zero.  That  is. omission of  technological 
opportunity  tends  to overstate  the  effect of  industry concentration on 
innovativeness,  creating  a  distinctly pro-Schumpeterian bias  in the 
results.<9) 
Thus,  two  basic concerns must  guide  the construction of our 
empirical  model  of  innovations.  First,  one  must  be  able to measure 
both  the direct  and  the  indirect effects of market  power  on  innovation, 
and.  as  argued  above,  this  requires  that  we  correct  for variations  in 
expected  post-innovation  rates of  return.  This  we  shall do  by 
including  a  variable in the  regression measuring  post-innovation 
price-cost margins.  Since  a  zero  level of  expected post-innovation 
returns is likely to discourage  firms  from  doing  any  research whatever 
the degree of  competition,  we  introduce  the profitability variable in 
log  form.<IO)  Second,  one  must  correct for variations in 
technological  opportunity across industries.  The  importan~ point to 
grasp  here  is that while  technological  opportunity varies sector by 
sector, it is roughly constant over time.  Hence,  for  each industry 
over time,  it can  be  captured by  a  constant,  but  only  t~  vne  that 
varies in value  across sectors.  Thus,  to correct for variations in -27-
technological  opportunity.  we  shall  include  a  full  set  of  1ndustry 
specific  "fixed  effects".  Finally,  to  these  two  concerns  we  shall  add  a 
third.  Previous studies of  the  Schumpeterian  hypothesis  have  focused 
on  the  role of market  concentration  in affecting  innovation.  hinging 
the  entire test of  the  Schumpeterian  hypothesis  on  a  single  partial 
correlation.  This  seems  to  be  unduly  restrictive.  and,  in what 
follows,  we  shall  use  six measures  of  rivalry,  looking  for  a  consistent 
pattern of  signs  rather  than  a  single  positive or  negative  sign. 
Using  the  data  on  innovations  discussed  above,  we  have 
conducted  tests of  the  Schumpeterian hypothesis  for  the  U.K •• 
1970-79.  The  basic  model  that  we  have  used  is: 
( 1 )  I-:: 
1 
where  i=l, ••• ,N  indexes  industries,  ti =an industry specific constant 
reflecting i's "technological  opportunity",  log  '~i  =  the  log  of 
post-innovation price-cost margins  in industry i.  Mi  = the  degree  of 
monopoly,  Zi  =  other observable  factors  affecting innovations,  and  ~i 
is a  residual.  Ii  may  be  positive or negative,  and,  indeed,  if  'li~o 
_._ 
then Ii  ~ -ro.  Observed  innovations,  Ii.  are  always  non-negative  and  so 
the  data must  be  described  using  a  Tobit  model, 
( 2)  { 
I. 
1 
I. 
1 
0  othen.Jise. 
If  ~ 1 >0,  then expected  post-innovation  returns stimulate innovation. 
Holding  log  '~i  constant  enables one  to  observe  the  direct effect of 
monopoly  on  innovativeness,  ~ 2 ;  the  indirect effect is  ~ 1  times  the 
effect that monopoly,  Hi,  has  on  'li or,  equivalently,  log  '~i• -28-
To  estimate  the  N•4  parameters  in  \~l.  one  needs  to  use  panel 
data  (i.e.  a  times  series of  cross-sections).  The  advantage  of  panel 
data is that  tracking  a  single cross-section unit.  i, over  time  enables 
one  to  estimate ti•  and  also  enables  one  to bring  more  inforrnatin  to 
bear  to  the  task  of  estimating all  the  parameters  of  (2)  more 
efficiently.  We  have  used  two  cross section samples  of  73  M.L.H.  (or. 
three digit)  industries  for  1970-74  and  1975-79  respectively. (ll)  The 
dependent  variable is the  number  of  innovations  introduced  in each  of 
the  two  five  year  periods. 
For  the  Zi•  we  have  used  five  variables:  the  growth  of  industry 
sales  (GROWi)~  industry size  measured  as  the  log of  industry capital 
stock  (SIZEi)•  the  average  industry capital  output  ratio  (~~Pi)• 
industry export  intensity  (EXPORTi),  and  industry  unionization measured 
as  the  percentage  of  the workforce  covered  by  collective agreements 
(UNIONi).  These  variables are  included  to correct for omitted factors 
whose  effects might  otherwise mistakenly  be  attributed to market  power. 
and  were  chosen  for  inclusion on  the  basis of  previous  appearance  in 
the  literature  and  a  suspected correlation with  the  various  measures  of 
rivalry. 
Finally.  we  were  able  to measure  various  dimensions  of 
competition and  rivalry in markets  much  more  extensively  than hitherto. 
The  six measures  that we  have  used  are:  industry concentration  (CONi), 
the  percentage change  in industry concentration within  the  period 
(6CONi)•  industry  import  intensity  (IMPORTi),  the gross share of sales 
by  new  entrants  and  by  exitors  (ENTRYi  and  EXITi),  and  the  relative 
number  of  firms  sized 99  employees  or less  (SFIRMi).  If rivalry 
stimulates  i!"!::-:.,.rativeness,  then  one  expects  to see  IMPORT,  ENTRY,  and 
SFIRM  positively correlated to innovativeness,  and  the other three -29-
negatively correlated;  the  Schumpeterian hypothesis  that  market  power 
is conducive  to  innovation  predicts exactly  the  opposite  pattern of 
signs.  Thus,  if the  coefficients on  CON,  ~ON and  EXIT  are negative 
while  those  on  IMPORT,  ENTRY  and  SFIRM  are  positive,  we  conclude  that 
market  power  has  a  negative direct effect on  innovation.  If,  on  the 
other hand.  one  observed  CON,  ~ON and  EXIT  to  have  positive 
correlations with  innovativeness  and  IMPORT.  ENTRY  and  SFIRM  to  have 
negative  ones,  then  this suggests  a  positive direct effect and,  almost 
surely,  evidence  in support  of  the  Schumpeterian hypothesis.  Any  other 
pattern of  signs is uninformative  on  the  hypothesis of interest. 
Table  III  shows  the  results of  this test.  The  estimating 
equation is 
( 3)  I.  = e  +  e  * log'li  +  e2  * CON.  +  e3  * GROWi  +  e4  * SIZE. 
1  0  1  1  1 
+  es  *  6CON.  +  e6*KAPi  +  e7*IMPORTi  +  e8  *  ENTRY. 
1  .  1 
+  99  *  EXPORT.  +  810  *  SFIRM.  +  9
11  * EXIT.  +  912  * UNION  +  }J. 
1  1  1  1 
The  estimates  reported  in columns  (i)  and  (ii) are  OLS  and  Tobit 
estimates of  (3),  and  provide  evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the 
notion  that  there is a  positive direct effect of actual monopoly  on 
innovativeness.  e2  is negative  and significantly different  from  zero,  e8 
positive and  nearly significant, e10  positive and  clearly signficant,  e11 
negative  and  significant and e5  negative  and  significant.  Only e7  is clearly 
insignificant,  and  it is also  the  only variable whose  coefficient breaks  the 
essentially anti-Schumpeterian pattern displaved on  Table  III.  It therefore 
seems  to  be  the case  that highly concentrated industries and  those  in the -30-
TABLE  III 
Regression  results  for  equation  (3) 
Independent 
Variables 
( i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv) 
log'li  4.204  1. 16  1. 70  2.85 
(.8917)  ( . 1  76)  ( . 295)  (.438) 
CONi  -50.87  -57.570  .824  -77.10 
(3.05)  i2.274)  ( . 960)  (2.44) 
ENTRYi  31.864  18.51  -2.512  85.07 
(1.94)  (1.05)  (.597)  (2.21) 
IMPORTi  -2.1.37  -3.80  -] . 902  11.08 
( . 239)  (.122)  ( -1.60)  (.545) 
SFIRMi  12.462  3. 165  -1.22  9.281 
(2.131)  (1.09)  (.886)  (1.028) 
EXITi  -18.025  -26.171  .775  -56.29 
(2.207)  (-1.38)  (.225)  (1.59) 
6CONi  -7.688  -9.734  -.078  -9.631 
(2.238)  (2.02)  (.073)  (1.22) 
SIZEi  .0709  4.271  1.22  -1.701 
(.016)  (.625)  (3.932)  (.182) 
GROWi  2.296  3.44  .668  -.879 
(2.06)  (1.91)  ( 1 • 44)  (.328) 
KAYOi  .906  .835  -.366  2.642 
(1.75)  ( 1 . 25)  (3.17)  (1.38) 
EXPORTi  4.008  6.987  4.64  -.1515 
(.916)  (.883)  (3.27)  (.019) 
UNIONi  -7.77  -2.61  .243  -29.94 
(1.76)  (.489)  (.135)  (3.34) 
LogL  -392.58  -309.823  -64.2955  -278.283 -31-
Notes  to  Table  III 
All  the  equations  include  fixed  effects;  t-values  (in absolute value) 
are  given  in brackets  below  estimated coefficients.  The  definition of 
the  variables  1s:  Ii  = number  of  innovations;  CONi  =  5  firm 
concentration ratio;  GROWi  =  % change  in domestic  production over  the 
period;  SIZEi  = log of  industry capitalstock;  DCONi  = % change  in 
industry concentration;  ~~YOi = capital-output  ratio;  TMPORTi  =  jmports 
as  a  % of  sales;  ENTRYi  = market  share  of  entrants  in  year  of  entry; 
EXPORT1  = exports  as  a  % of  sales;  SFIRMi  =  No.  firms  ~99 employees  as 
a  % of  total  number  of  firms;  EXITi  = market  share  of  exiting  firms  in 
the  year of  exit;  UNIONi  =  % workforce  covered  by  collective 
agreements;  and  log~i = expected  post-innovation price-cost margins. 
Column  (i)  presents  an  estimate  of  equation  (3)  using OLS.  Columns 
(ii)  and  (iii) are Tobit  and  Probit  estimates of  the  same  equation. 
while  column  (iv)  shows  the  regression in column  (i) applied  to  the 
sample  of  industries for which  li>O,  with  an appropriate  censored 
sample  bias correction. -32-
process  of  becoming  more  concentrated  are  less  innovat1ve  than  more 
competitive  looking ones.  There  is also  a  noticeable  tendency  for  this 
to  be  true  in industries subject  to  high  entry  rates~  low  exit  rates. 
and  in industries which have  a  large small  firm sector. 
import  competition on  innovativeness  is negligible. 
The  effect of 
The  sign pattern of  the  remaining six variables contains  few 
surprises.  e11 •  the  coefficient  ~n log 'i· has  a  positive effect  on 
innovativeness.  but  one  that  is extremely difficult  to  estimate with 
precision.  Industry size  (94),  export  intensity  (99),  and  unionization 
(912>.  all appear  to  be  relatively unrelated  to  innovativeness.  while 
growth  (93)  and  capital  intensity  (96)  are  positively associated with 
innovativeness  (albeit weakly).  As  remarked  above,  these  variables 
have.  in  the  main,  been  included  in order  to  avoid  generating  any  bias 
in the  estimates of e2•  e5•  e7,  e8,  e10  and e11 •  However,  it is worth 
noting  that  they  do  suggest  that market size per se has  no  apparent 
effect on  innovativeness,  although.  as  expected,  high growth  rates seem 
to  go  hand  in hand  with more  innovations. 
The  results on  Table  III are  extremely  robust  to  a  wide  range 
of  respecifications.  They  are more  or less  invariant  to quite 
substantial  changes  in the specification of  (the  log of) 
post-innovation returns.  Use  of  rates of  return on  capital  rather than 
price-cost margins,  specifying  returns  in terms  of  levels  and  not  logs, 
and  use  of  a  rational  expectations  proxy  for  expected post-innovation 
returns  rather than actual,  observed  returns all had  little effect. 
The  results are also quite insensitive to changes in the vector of 
exogenous variables.  Dropping  any  one  or any  subsample  produced very 
little effect on  the  remaining  estimated coefficient,  ~:though 
t-statistics often increased.  Since it is reasonable  to argue  that -33-
many  of  the  s1x  rivalry  var1ables  may  be  caused  by  1nnovat1ons.  tests 
on  the  exogeneity  of  those  six variables  - collectively,  singly  and  in 
groups  - were  performed.  In all cases.  the  null  hypothesis  that  they 
are  exogenous  to  the  process generating  innovations  could  not  be 
rejected.  The  only  variable  for  which  these  tests were  at  all  close  to 
rejecting that  null  was  the  level  of  industry concentration.  CONi.  Two 
stage  least  squares  estimates allowing  CON  to  be  endogenous  produced  an 
estimate  of  its coefficient  which  was  somewhat  more  negative  than  those 
displayed on  Table  III.  indicating  that  the  estimates  of  this 
coefficient  reported  on  Table  III  are  biased upwards if they  are  biased 
at all.  Finally.  estimating  the  model  (3)  across  the  two 
cross-sections  taken separately  (and  neglecting  the  fixed  effects) 
yielded virtually identical  results for  each  taken separately. 
Columns  (ii)-(iv) on Table  III show  further experiments with 
the  regression  reported in (i).  Since  about  25%-30%  of  the  industry 
5-year periods  reported  no  innovations~  then  (i)  is~  in principle. 
liable to  be  affected  by  a  censored variable bias.  A Tobit  estimator 
is appropriate  for situations such  as  this.  and  Tobit  estimates of  (i) 
are shown  as  (ii)  on  the  Table.  Clearly nothing of  substance is 
affected  by  reestimating the model  in this manner.  although small 
biases are present.  The  Tobit  model  itself is.  however.  rather 
restrictive.  for it assumes  that  the determinants of  limit observations 
(Ii=O)  are  identical  to the determinants of  the density of  non-limit 
observations.  (Ii given that  Ii>O).  One  can  relax this assumption in a 
number  of ways.  but one  of  the simplest  and  most  straightforward is the 
so-called "double hurdle"  mode1.< 12 >  This is a  two  equation model  in 
which  the first step is a  Probit estimate determining whether or not 
inovations occur  (Ii=O  or Ii>O).  ~~i the second step is an  OLS  estimate 
determining the  number  of  innovations that occur given that at least -34-
one  is  reported.  The  rationale  behind  the  model  is straightfoJVard. 
and  hinges  on  there  being  effects conveyed  through  the  independent 
variables which  affect  the  ability to  innovate  (li=O  or  Ii>O)  in a 
manner  which differs  from  the  intensity of  innovation given  that 
innovation occurs at all  (li given  Ii>O).  These  equations  are  shown  as 
(iii)  and  (iv)  respectively  on  the  Table.  The  Probit  estimates suggest 
that  the  degree  of  competition has  very little effect on  the 
probability  that  an  innovation will  occur.  but  the  estimates  in  (iv) 
show  that competition  increases  - and  monopoly  power  reduces  - the 
number  of  innovations  introduced given that at  least one  is introduced. 
Thus.  it appears  to  be  the  case  that monopolists are  not  so much  less 
likely  to  innovate  as  they  are  less  likely to  do  so  more  intensively 
than  firms  in more  competitive sectors. 
The  estimates on  Table  III also cast some  interesting light on 
the  role  played  by  "technological opportunity" in accounting  for 
inter-industry variations in innovativeness.  It is plausible  to  think 
that  the  conditions of  technological  opportunity are correlated with 
many  of  the  twelve  independent  variables  that  we  have  used  in  the 
regressions  on  Table  III.  A regression of  the  estimated values  of  the 
fixed  effects on  the  twelve  independent  variabless  produced  an  R2 
slightly in excess of  50%.  The  results  (not  shown)  suggest  that 
industries with high  technological  opportunity are not  only  to  be 
highly concentrated,  but  are also  large,  not  very highly capital 
intensive,  and  rather more  profitable than  the  rest.  Given  this, it is 
not  very surprising to discover that failing  to correct  for variations 
in technological  opportunity across industries  (acheived  by  suppressing 
the  fixed  effects and  forcing  each industry to have  the  same  intercept) 
leads  to substantial bias.  In particular,  doing this makes 
concentration appear  to  be  positively  (but  not significantly) -35-
correlated  to  1nnovat1ons.  and  to  make  both  market  s1ze  and  expected 
post-innovation profits positively  and  significantly correlated  to 
innovations.  Large,  profitable and  highly  concentrated markets  appear 
to  be  more  progresive~  but  this seems  to  be  more  or  less entirely due 
to  the  fact  that  they  have  a  richer "technological  opportunity"  than 
other sectors.  Correcting  for  technological  opportunity makes  it plain 
that market  size  and  profitability have  little systematic  effect  on 
innovations,  and  that  highly  concentrated  1ndustries are  significantly 
') 
less  progress1ve  than  the  rest.  Finally,  a  decomposition  of  the  R~ 
statistics for  (i)  on  Table  III suggests  that variations in 
technological  opportunity  taken  alone  account  for  at  least  60%  of  the 
variation in  innovations.  while  the  twelve  observables  in  (2)  account, 
at best,  for  about  30%.  Thus,  technological  opportunity  appears  to 
play  a  major  role  in explaining  inter-industry variations  in  rates of 
innovation. 
Thus  far,  we  have  established  that  the direct effects of 
monopoly  power  on  innovation are  nega~ive;  that  is,  that monopolists 
respond  more  slowly  and  less sensitively  to  a  given  level  of  expected 
post-innovation  returns  arising  from  any  given  innovation  than more 
competitive  firms.  However,  it is possible  that  these  negative direct 
effects partially or.  indeed,  more  than offset  by  positive indirect 
effects,  leading  to  a  positive total effect of  monopoly  on  innovation. 
Thus,  the  next  step is to calculate the  indirect effects of  monopoly  on 
innovation. 
To  calculate the  indirect effect of  monopoly  on  innovation,  one 
needs  to  know  how  post-innovation returns are affected by  monopoly,  and 
how  they affect  innovative activity in turn.  Estimates of  the  latter -36-
,i.e.  e 1
~  are  shown  on  the  first  row  of  Table  III.  and  are  invariably 
positive  but  not  significant.  To  estimate  the  effects of monopoly  on 
post-innovation profits.  one  needs  to  estimate  an  equation of  the  form 
(4)  log "i  M  ·  +  n 3  W.  +  E.  1  'II  1  1. 
where  log  ~i = the  log  of  actual  price-cost  margins,  and  the  Wi  are 
other  exogenous  variables.  Using  (4).  the  indirect £ffect of  monopoly 
on  innovation  is 02e1 •  We  have  specified  (4)  to  include all  twelve 
independent variables  in  (3),  and  also  have  included several further 
variables  to  identify  the  two  equation system.  (3)-(4).  Table  IV  shows 
the  results of  these calculations.  The  firs~ column  is an  estimate of 
(4),  and,  using  (ii)  on  Table  III.  is combined  to give  an  estimate of  the 
total  effect  of  monopoly  on  innovation in  column  (ii).  Thus,  for 
example,  the direct effect of  ENTRY  is  (from  (ii) on  Ill)  18.51;  the 
indirect effect is  (1.16)  x  (-.838)  = -.972,  and  thus  the  total effect 
is= 17.54. 
Table  IV  tells a  very  simple  and  straightforward story. 
Equation  (i)  shows  that  rivalry  (i.e.  low  CON,  high  ENTRY,  high  IMPORT. 
high  SFIRM,  low  EXIT.  and  high 6CON)  reduces  price-cost margins, 
ceteris paribus.  Thus,  for  an  innovation which  yields  a  given total of 
potential profits,  one  expects  to observe  monopolists  appropriating 
more  of it than would  be  managed  by  firms  in more  competitive sectors. 
And,  since this higher  realized profit has  a  positive  (if statisticlaly 
weak)  effect on  innovativeness,  it is clearly the case  that  the 
indirect effect of  monopoly  on  innovation is positive.  Since  Table Ill 
suggests  that  the direct effects are  negative,  the size and  sign of the -37-
total  effect  of  monopoly  on  inovativeness  is uncertain.  Putting 
together  the  estimates  on  Tables  III  and  IV,  it is clear that  the 
trade-off  which  exists in principle does  not  amount  to  much  in 
practice.  In virtually every case,  the sign of  the  total effect of  a 
variable  on  innovation is the  same  as  the  sign of its direct effect 
computed  by  holding  unexpected  post-innovation returns constant.  What 
is more.  in most  cases  the sizes of  the  direct  and  effects are 
virtually  the  same.  Thus,  one  concludes  that  the  ind1rect  feedback 
from  market  structure  (and  other variables)  to  innovation is weak  and 
extremely uncertain in effect.  The  negative direct effects shown  on 
Table  III clearly suggest  that monopolists  are slower  to  respond  to 
profitable  innovative opportunities than  are  firms  in more  competitive 
markets;  the  very  small  indirect  effects  revealed  on  Table  IV  suggest 
that  there is absolutely  no  systematic  tendency  for  the  higher 
post-innovation  returns  that monopolists  appear  to  enjoy  to compensate 
for  their relative weaker  response  to such opportunities. 
Thus,  it seems  plain that  there  is virtually no  evidence 
whatsoever  in  the  data which  support  the  view  that  monopoly  or market 
power is conducive  to  innovative activity.  Opening  up  most  markets  to 
more  competitive  forces  - lowering  industry concentration,  raising net 
entry rates,  and sustaining a  large  and  vibrant small  firm sector 
- seems  likely to have  a  positive  and  healthy effect on  innovative 
activity. 
One  might  reasonably ask,  however~ what  the  longer  run effects 
of  innovative activity  i~ likely to be.  In particular, will higher 
levels of  innovative activity make  markets  even more  competitive,  or 
does  innovation have  a  centralizing effect on  the structure of markets? 
If it is the  case that  innovation is decentralizing and  so  increases -38-
TABLE  JV 
Regression  results  for  equation  ( 4) 
(i)  (ii) 
CON·  1  .323  -58.919 
( • 270) 
"'-._" 
ENTRYi  -.838  17.54 
(2.56) 
IMPORTi  -.0049  -.412 
(.017) 
SFIRMi  -.260 
(1.87) 
3.37 
EXITi  .445  -24.93 
( 1 . 48) 
l::.CONi  -.102  -10.241 
(1.20) 
SIZEi  -.239  3.698 
(1.71) 
GROWi  -.056  3.333 
(1.81) 
•  KAYOi  -.017  .816 
( 1 . 30) 
EXPORTi  .020 
(1.39) 
6.885 
UION  .040  -2.52 
(.234) 
Equation  (i) has  the  log of price-cost margins  as its dependent 
variable and  also includes  fixed effects,  risk,  an  instrument  for 
innovations,  concentration squared and  size squared.  Column  (ii) is 
the  total effects computed  from  (i) and  (ii) on  Table  III.  Indirect 
effects for  CON  were  computed  at sample  mean  values,  CON  = .517. -39-
competition  in markets.  then  the  basic  relat1onship  bet~een competit1on 
and  innovation  that  we  have  identified is mutually  reinforcing. 
Competition  breeds  innovative  activity which,  in turn.  increases  the 
degree  of  competition.  If this is the  case.  then policies designed  to 
increase  the  size of markets  and  increase  competition will  have  a  long 
run effect  in excess of  their short  run  effect.  If,  on  the  other hand, 
innovation is centralizing,  then such policies will  increase 
competition  and  innovativeness  only  in  the  short  run.  As  the  process 
gets under way,  the  increase  in innovative  activity will  counteract  the 
initial effects of  the policy.  Long  run  effects will  be  less  than 
those  observed in the short  run  and,  indeed,  may  ultimately completely 
offset  the  initial policy actions.  Thus,  before  finally  concluding 
that competition stimulates  innovativeness,  one  must  check  to  see  that 
short  run effects do  indeed  persist. 
To  explore this question,  one  needs  to know  something  about  the 
feedback  from  innovation to market  structure.  The  work  on  Table  III 
uses. six measures  of  market  structure or its changes.  but  most  interest 
focuses  on  industry concentration.  Hence,  we  shall specialize  the 
question somewhat,  and  ask whether  innovative  activity tends  to 
concentrate or deconcentrate markets.<lJ)  The  simplest and  most 
straightforward way  to  investigate this question is to use  a  dynamic 
model  which distinguishes  short  from  long  run  movements  in market 
concentration,  and  allows  for partial adjustment  to  changes  in the 
latter.  The  model  was  estimated across  the  same  73  industries in the 
two  five  year  time periods  1970-74  and  1975-79  as  the  regressions 
reported on  Table III,  and  yielded  the  estimated equation -40-
6CONt  -1.083  CONt-I  +  .0056  KAYOt  -.003  SIZEt 
(23.28)  (3.67)  (2.51) 
-
+  .00.35  tJ<AYOt  +  .0149 6SIZEt  - .OOlllt 
( 1 •  0 8 )  ( • 6 90 )  ( 3 • 59 ) 
plus  industry specific  fixed  effects  <R2  =  .71),  where  It is an 
instrument  for It,  and  where  now  ~ONt =  CONt- CONt-I~  and  similarly 
with 6KAYOt  and  ~IZEt.  It is plain  from  (5)  that  innovations  have  a 
clear~ statistically significant  negative  effect  on  market 
concentration.  and  thus  that  an  increase  in innovativeness will  reduce 
long  run  levels  of  concentration.  Further,  the  partial  adjustment 
parameter  irnplies.that  the  effect of  this change  in  long  run 
concentration levels will  be  fully -incorporated  into actual,  observed 
levels  of  market  concentration  largely withi_n  "the  period"  (i.e.  ~~ithin 
about  five  years).  Like  those  reported  on  Tables  III  and  IV,  the 
results  reported  in  (5)  are  extremely  robust.  Letting It be  endogenous 
or  lagging  it had  no  substantive effect  on  the  results.  and,  similarly, 
the  inclusion or exclusion of  SIZEt.  KAYOt.  ~YOt and  ~1ZEt sjnglv 
or  in groups  had  no  real  effect. 
Combined  with  the  estimates  of  (3)  reported  above.  (5)  suggests 
that  increases in competition and  in innovative activity are  mutually 
reinforcing.  A competitive market  produces more  innovations  than  a 
more  monopolistic one,  and  the  result of  this innovative activity is to 
make  markets  more  competitive.  Hence,  over  time  one  expects  to observe 
a  gradually increasing spiral of innovation and  decreases in market 
concentration  (all other factors held constant),  decreases which will 
further boost  innovation rates.  Clearly a  one-off  increase in 
competition,  say as  the  result of  policy initiatives to  reduce -41-
intra-Communitv  barriers to  trade,  will  hasten  th1s  e\·olutionary 
process.  and  produce  long  run  effects in excess  of  those  observed  in 
the short  run. 
One  final  set of  remarks  is in order.  While  it is clear  that 
the  degree  of  competition has  an  effect on  innovative  activity  (and  one 
that  feeds  back  on  itself) it is less  than clear that  market  size per 
se  has  any  impact  on  innovation.  It appears  to  be  true  that markets 
which  are  rich in  technological  opportunity are  also  frequently  rather 
large,  but it is plain from  Table  III  that  once  variations in 
technological  opportunity across  industries is held  constant,  then size 
per se  plays  very  little role  in affecting  innovation rates.  Whatever 
importance  market  size has  is indirect,  operating only to  the  extent 
that  large  markets  are  less concentrated,  attract more  entry,  and  so 
on.  Regression  (5)  suggests that,  at  least with  respect  to movements 
in industry concentration,  the effect of  increased market size is 
minimal.  Other studies in the  literature have  reported positive 
effects of  size on  entry rates  and  significant negative effects on 
concentation,  but  most  studies  seem  to suggest  that  these  effects are 
small.<l4)  One  emerges  with  the clear feeling  that  initiatives to open 
up  the  internal  Community  market will  have  a  positive effect on  rates 
of  innovation only  to  the extent  that  they  increase competitiveness. 
Measures  aimed  solely at increasing market  size without  affecting the 
degree  of competition are unlikely to produce  a  discernable  impact  on 
dynamic  efficiency. -42-
V.  SUMMARY 
The  basic  argument  and  results of  this paper are  as  follows. 
(1)  Recent  policy measures  proposed  in the  context of  efforts to 
reduce  intra-Community  trade  barriers are  likely  to affect both  the 
size of  and  the  degree  of  competition  in markets; 
(2)  increases  in market  size are  likely to  yield static efficiency 
gains if economies  of  scale exist,  and  increases in  the degree  of 
competition will  reinforce  this  to  the  extent  that  they  lead  to  a 
reduction  in X-inefficiency. 
(3)  In principle,  increases  in market  size ought  to stimulate 
innovativeness  and  raise the dynamic  efficiency of markets; 
(4)  however,  increases in the  degree  of  competition could  lead  to  a 
reduction in  innovativeness· to  the  extent  that  large  firm  size and 
market  power  are  necessary for innovation. 
(5)  The  data  reveals  that  there are  no  obvious  advantages  to  firm 
size or  to market  power  in generating  innovative activity in the short 
or in the  long  run. 
(6}  It follows  that moves  to  open  up  internal markets within the 
Community  are unlikely to  lead to any  important  trade-offs between  the 
realization of static and  dynamic  efficiencies.  The  static gains to 
such policy proposals almost  certainly  understate the total gains  to 
be  realized  from  their implementation. -43-
Notes 
1.  This  argument  follows  Gilbert  and  Newberry.  1982.  If  the  initial 
monopoly  is based  on  an  innovation  then,  if it introduces  a  second 
innovation.  the  monopolist  can coordinate  the  pricing of  the  goods 
associated with  the  two  innovations.  If,  by  contrast,  an  entrant 
introduced  the  second  innovation,  then competition would  prevail 
between  the  two  goods.  The  returns  the  entrant would  earn are, 
therefore.  less  tnan  the  returns  that  the  monopolist  would  get if 
it introduced  both  goods,  and  this means  that  the  monopolist  would 
have  a  greater incentive  to  introduce it, pre-empting  the 
entrant. 
2.  The  terms  are  due  to  Rothwell  (1985);  the  debate  that  follows  in 
the  text  i5  discussed  at greater  length in Scherer  (1980. 
pp.423-38). 
3.  This  has  been  extensively discussed  in game  theoretic models  of 
R&D;  see,  amongst  others,  Scherer  1967,  Loury  1979,  and  Reinganum 
1982;  for  good  surveys,  see  Kamien  & Schwartz,  1982,  and  Dasgupta, 
1986. 
4.  This  is the  well  known  argument  of  Arrow,  1962;  Fellner,  1951, 
also stressed that  the  foregone  profits from  the displaced  line of 
activity can act  as  an  opportunity cost  slowing  down  the 
introduction of  the  new  innovation. 
5.  On  the  standard,  static efficiency vs.  monopoly  power  trade-off 
which is caused by  economies  of scale,  see Williamson  (1968). 
6.  For  good  surveys,  see Scherer  (1980)  or Kamien  and  Schwartz 
(1982);  Fisher and  Temin  (1973)  critically discuss how  much  can be 
inferred about  the Schumpeterian hypothesis  from  regressions of 
firm size on  R&D  inputs. 
7.  In addition to Scherer  (1980)  and  Kamien  and  Schwartz  (1982),  see 
also  Ergas  (1984).  In  a  recent study in the  UK.  Schott  (1977) 
discovered  that  many  large  firms  aim  for  extremely modest 
technical  advances  whose  value  depreciates extremely  rapidly. 
8.  Previous work  in the  literature has concentrated on  simple partial 
correlations between market  structure  (as measured  by 
concentration ratios)  and  measures  of  research inputs or 
innovative output,  and  have  interpreted a  positive correlation 
between  the  two  as evidence consistent with  the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis.  Since this  c~rrelation does  not measure  either the 
direct or the indirect effect of monopoly  on  innovation,  it is a 
little difficult  to interpret.  For surveys of  this literature, 
see Kamien  and  Schwartz  (1982)  or Scherer  (1980). 
9.  See,  for example,  Phillips  (1966),  Scherer  (1967);  Cohen  et al 
(1987)  find much  the  same  effect in firm size and  R&D 
regressions. 
10.  We  also tried using rational expectations proxies of 
post-innovation returns  rather than observed post-innovation 
returns,  but no  significant differences  emerged  from  this.  The 
rational expectations proxy for  expected post-innovation profits 
used  a  two  equation structural model  of profits and  innovations  to 
derive a  reduced form  expression linking profits to all the -44-
exogenous  variables  in the  system.  Assuming  that  agents  possess 
rational  expectat1ons,  one  can  then use  the  predictions  from  this 
reduced  form  equation  to  proxy  expectations.  since  these 
predictions are exactly what  a  rational  agent  who  knew  the 
structure of  the  model  would  use  (for further discussion of  the 
econometric  issues associated with  rational  expectations models, 
see Wallis  (1980)  and  Wickens  (1982)). 
11.  The  innovations data base  only  provides  80  possible  MLH  industry 
classifications,  and  7  further industries were  eliminated  because 
of holes  in our capital stock series.  Five  year intervals were 
chosen  to minimize  the  effect of  any  inaccuracies in recording  the 
precise date  of  innovation. 
12.  For  a  good  discussion of  limited  dependent  variable models.  see 
Maddala  (1983);  Blundell  and  Meghir  (1987)  discuss  the  "double 
hurdle"  model. 
13.  We  have  done  some  simple  reduced  form  regressions which  indicate 
that increases in  innovation  increase entry and  exit at  a 
diminishing  rate,  and  reduce  imports,  small  firm activity and 
percentage changes  in market  concentration at  a  diminishing  rate. 
None  of  these effects appear  to  be  strong or significant. 
14.  See  Geroski  and  Masson  (1987)  and  Curry  and  George  (1983). 
respectively.  for surveys  of  these studies. -45-
Data  Appendix 
11  = number  of  major  commercially  successful  innovations  used  in 
industry i.  this data is based  on  a  major  study  by  SPRU.  Univesity 
of  Sussex,  of  4378  major  innovations  in  the  U.K ••  1945-83;  for 
details see  Townsend,  1981,  and  Robson  and  Townsend.  1984.  The  data 
was  obtained  from  the  ESRC  Data Archive at Essex. 
•i = price-cost  margins,  defined as  net  output  less  the  wage  bill 
less net capital expenditure divided  by  gross output.  Data was 
obtained  from  the  Census. 
DCON  and  CONi  = percentage  change  and  level  of  the  5-firm 
concentration ratio,  from  the  Census  of  Production. 
ENTRYi  and  EXITi  =  market  share  of  all  new  (exiting)  firms.  The  data 
was  drawn  from  a  special  compilation made  by  ENTRY  and  EXIT  for  the 
1980-74  period were  measured  by  1974  values of  the variables since 
data for  1970-73  was  not available. 
IMPORTi  and  EXPORT1  =  import  and  export  intensity,  obtained  from  the 
DTI  via the  MICRODATA  data based  compiled at  the OECD.  this data is 
virtually the  same  as is available in the  Business Monitor. 
SFIRMi  =  relative number  of  firms  ~99 employees,  from  the  Census.  One 
or  tow  missing  observations were  filled using  Order  averages. 
SIZEi  and  KATO·  = log of  industry assets and  capital stock output 
ratio.  obtaine~ from  calculations made  by  D.- Allard for  the OFT. 
UNIONi  = % of workers  covered  by  a  collective agreement,  from  the  New 
Earnings Survey.·  One  or two  missing  observations were  filled using 
Order averages. 
All  other variables used  were  derived  from  these or directly obtained  from  the 
Census  of  Production;  all market  shares have  been adjusted  for  imports  and 
exports. -46-
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